

ABSTRACT

The rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, following the January 25th, 2011 revolution, raised many questions regarding the United States' positions and attitudes toward the two events' phases, and the direction of its policy. Hence, this study seeks to analyze and interpret the U.S policy toward the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood after the revolution. Through highlighting the event itself in the analysis of its effects and impact on U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt, especially if taken into consideration Egypt's geopolitical and security importance to Washington.

The study discusses, in an analytical approach, the American response to the Egyptian revolution, since the outbreak of the protests and the overthrow of President Mubarak, passing through the transition phase and the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, until the fall of President Morsi and the ascension of the former Defense Minister Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi to presidency. By tracking what was issued by the U.S. administration, statements, positions, and decisions, which reflect the internal and external determinants of American foreign policy. The study relied on the realist theory in analysis and interpretation of U.S. policy toward political transition in Egypt after the revolution, and its interactions with the events.

The study is divided into four chapters which cover the time period surrounding the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the first chapter the study shed light on American foreign policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood in the last ten years before the outbreak of the revolution. The study infers that the interaction with the Muslim Brotherhood was among the United States' strategy, and perhaps the strong presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian community, and consequently the expected ascension to them as an active player in the political system, or because the group was able to replace Mubarak when any potential political change, had put them in the United States' considerations, on the basis that there must be consensus to secure American interests with all candidates that could replace Mubarak.

Chapter II addresses the U.S. response to the Egyptian revolution, and its interactions with the events of the transitional phase until the ascension of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi to power. It seemed that the U.S. administration has made diplomatic efforts to keep President Hosni Mubarak in office until the end of his term. But after Mubarak stepping down, the Egyptian reality imposed itself, and things went in its normal direction toward the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. And with a realistic oriented attitude, the United States has been engaged in a strategic dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood, the strongest candidate to take over power, and it seemed to get consensus on the fundamental interests of the United States in

Egypt, without necessarily reflecting the support or not to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Chapter III considers some of President Mohamed Morsi external and internal policies, which had repercussions and impact on American foreign policy towards Egypt. It was not clear that Morsi's governance was inconsistent with the United States' interests and will, but his regime appeared unable to manage a state of political and security importance for Washington like Egypt. From this perspective, the strategic relations between the two countries and thus the American interests related to it, besides the Egyptian public opinion and popular movements, were accounted as determinants of Washington's policy and attitude towards Morsi's governance, and later on its removal.

The fourth chapter discusses Washington's position regarding the removal of President Morsi from office, and the repercussions of the event until Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi ascension to power. The nature of the opposition and protests was an important factor in shaping the army's role in the crisis, and how it responded to it. Hence there was caution in describing the removal of President Morsi by the Egyptian army as a coup in Washington's statements. But with increased resentment of repressive actions pursued by the Egyptian interim government and the Egyptian army against Morsi's supporters, in response to non-peaceful protests demanding his return to power, Washington has suspended part of its military aid to Egypt. The Obama administration realism was clear in its attitudes after being certain of Sisi's ascension to presidency. In spite of its repeated statements about protection of human rights, freedom of expression, democracy and inclusive governance, but Washington close cooperation with the Egyptian army remains a priority, and necessity for the strategic relations between the two countries and for Washington's regional interests. Hence, there was backtracking in the U.S. position, with regard to linking the resumption of U.S. aid to the extent of sticking to democratic principles.

The study concludes that the Obama administration was realistic in its policy toward the political transition process in Egypt after the revolution, including the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, in terms of maintaining the nature of the Egyptian regime, and consequently the interests of the United States associated to it, whomever its leadership and its internal policies, as long as do not impact Washington's interests negatively.